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name, just as easily, be Hiroshima, or Vietnam? 7 The whole passage from O'Malley's letter, from which the mentioned quote is taken, is especially telling:
Let us think of these things always and speak of them never. To speak of them never is the advice which I have been giving to the Polish Government, but it has been unnecessary. They have received the Soviet report in silence. Affliction and residence in this country seem to be teaching them how much better it is in political life to leave unsaid those things about which one feels most passionately. 8 The view of politics, in which it is better (in politics) not to speak about things about which one feels most passionately has of course, been a recurring target of Cavell's criticism in many of his political writings, but most prominently in his essay on Rawls, "The Conversation of Justice: Rawls and the Drama of Consent." There, Cavell 9 criticizes Rawlsian liberalism exactly on the account of closing off politics and political conversation for what one feels most passionately about .
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Of course, Rawls is no proponent of Realpolitik, far from it. But, what is missing from his account is precisely the account of how the departures from ideal justice (that is, real politics) influence our consent. As Cavell writes:
The idea of directing consent to the principles on which society is based rather than, as it were, to society as such, seems to be or to lead to an effort to imagine confining ot proportioning the consent I give my society-to imagine that the social contract not only states in effect that I may withdraw my consent $ . On America's engagement in Vietnam Cavell writes that America "is killing itself and killing another 7 country in order not acknowledge its helplessness in the face of suffering, in order not to acknowledge its separateness", Cavell, "The Avoidance it reaches into every corner of society's failure or ugliness. Between a society approaching strict compliance with the principles of justice and one approaching causes of civil disobedience, there is ground on which existent constitutional democracies circumscribe everyday lives. We know that the original position has prepared us for, what the lifted veil of ignorance has disclosed: the scene of our lives. The public circumstances in which I live, in which I participate, and from which I profit, are ones I consent to. They are ones with an uncertain measure of liberty and of goods that are not minimal, of delays in reform that are not inevitable. Consent to society is neither unrestricted nor restricted; its content is part of the conversation of justice. 11
How do these ruminations on Rawls, a prominent liberal philosopher, tie in with Cavell's discussion of Makavejev? The guiding thought of this passage is already present in the essay on Makavejev. As Cavell sees it-one of Makavejev's main themes is exactly how to react to what he calls (in the Rawls essay) "society's ugliness" if we have already consented to that society, the whole of society, and not just its principles and ideals, be they Rawlsian, or Marxist. According to Cavell, Makavejev's discovery lies in our capability to be disgusted by the world, or by what has been done, or is being done in our name, in the name of society we have consented to:
The discovery of adulthood through disgust was something acted out in the student movement in the time of our war in Vietnam. To perform ugly and indecent acts was an expression of the rejection of a world that asked for consent to its disgusting deeds. This was not my way of expression, partly because I had already given my consent to this world and partly because I do not unders-tand myself as performing ugly and indecent acts. But I understand that way, I felt the exactness of its spiritual accuracy. To say so was my way, and it has its own price. This is or was so obvious that serious films made during that period did not so much need to assert disgust with the world as to ask for its assessment, to acknowledge this fact of the world without letting it sap the motivation to work at this art, even if the art itself was the best context for the assessment.
[…] Alceste's interpretation of the uninhabitability of the world, that is, of his distaste, is to see the world as a scene of universal hypocrisy. Sweet Movie interprets this hypocrisy, as it were, by picturing the earth as full of corpses-buried evidence of mass murder, rotting ideals, corpses with souls still in them. The film attempts to extract hope-to claim to divine life after birthfrom the very fact that we are capable of genuine disgust at the world; that our revoltedness is the chance for a cleansing revulsion; that we may purge ourselves by living rather than by killing, willing to visit hell if that is the direction to something beyond purgatory; that the fight for freedom continues to originate in the demands of our instincts, the chaotic cry of our nature, our cry to have a nature. It is a work powerful enough to encourage us to see again that the tyrant's power continues to require our complicitous tyranny over ourselves. […] In my earlier essay I more or less accuse both Alceste and Othello of inviting Montaigne's terrible rebuke to mankind in "On some verses of Virgil": "What a monstrous animal to be a horror to himself, to be burdened by his pleasures, to regard him-self as a misfortune!" But I go on to say-something I take Sweet Movie to be saying-that the world during my lifetime rather shows that it is yet more horrible to lose this capacity for horror. 12 This parallel is interesting and important for our discussion in more ways than onefirst, it shows that the problematic of consent arises both in liberal societies (which are explicitly built on the myth of consent, or a version of consent theory) and in societies of communist aspirations such as Makavejev's Yugoslavia. What inhabitants of both of these types of societies have to face is a sort of hypocrisy, or discrepancy between the ideal justice towards which their societies, each in its own way, strive for (or by which they legitimize themselves) and the less than ideal (and sometimes positively murderous) practice. Here, the two types of society causing a similar type of response-disgust-are explicitly compared, with the example of Vietnam war, and the reactions of students who "used disgusting acts" to show their disgust towards the society which was asking for their consent. Cavell claims that, although he understood their reaction, he could not take part in it (since he already consented to his society)-but that he wrote about it and that way showed his own disgust toward what was happening. In this way he is akin to Makavejev-who shows us the Muehl commune (the commune of those who do not want to give their consent), but does not join it himself. As we will see, that is because, like Cavell, Makavejev has already consented to his society and his films represent his own mode of response to that society's "ugliness". What both share, however, is a refusal to limit their consent to the high ideals of their society, and a preparedness to take responsibility for its uglier aspects.
Here it is already quite obvious why the comparison that Boynik insists onbetween socialism (or communism) and fascism will not do as an interpretation of Cavell's views. For it is fundamentally impossible for an inhabitant of a fascist regime to consent to its principles, but not to its murderousness. It is impossible for a hypocrisy Makavejev and Cavell focus on, even to exist in a fascist society, in which there is no striving for ideal justice at all. (Numerous examples of citizens of fascist states who later claimed they did not know what was being done in their name, do not go against this-for our disbelief in their claims stems exactly from the fact is that even if they did not know about the particular cases of crimes-they could not have not known that the very principles they consented to were murderous themselves ). Realpolitik is not the flipside of the fascist societies, but their self-proclaimed guiding Cavell comments on this scene in the following way:
In the absence of gods, what WR tells us is that this woman lost her head to love because of a mortal who had already been turned to stone; that she was made a monster, a talking head without a body, or confirmed in monstrousness, by a man who interpreted his purity as demanding that he exempt himself from ordinary human desires, save himself for something higher. The woman's words for this-that is, the talking head's words, I mean of course Makavejev's words-are "He's romantic, ascetic, a genuine Red Fascist," a patriot. essay Experience, and Cavell discusses at length why the America Emerson speaks of might be "yet unapproachable", and comes to the conclusion that it is unapproachable because it has yet to be found, but that its finding requires what Emerson calls aversion, or what is more commonly known as conversion, a turning away from our current state, which Emerson's writing itself is supposed to exemplify. Writes Cavell: Then Emerson's writing is (an or promise of, the constitution for) this new yet unapproachable America: his aversion is a rebirth of himself into it (there will be other rebirths), its presence to us is unapproachable, both because there is nowhere else to go to find it, we have to turn toward it, reverse ourselves; and because we do not know if our presence to it is peopling it.
[…] The identification this writer proposes between his individual constitution and the constitution of his nation is a subject on its own. The endlessly repeated idea that Emerson was only interested in finding the individual should give way of founding a nation, writing its constitution, constituting its citizens. But then would the writer say "I found" (a new America) as if in answer to the opening question, "Where do we find?" (ourselves we are-otherwise how can we hear him? Do we? Does his character make an impression on us? Has he achieved a new degree of culture? 16 As Roger Griffin notes in his famous essay on fascism, there is something disturbing for the liberal ear, about the idea of the birth and rebirth of a nation, and Griffin ascribes that idea to the "core" of fascist ideology. While it is clear that there are many 17 deep differences between Emerson's individualism and any form of ethnic or cultural organicism, Cavell seems to be very aware of the charge that Emersonian perfectionism is "smoothing the way for fascism," and has repeatedly returned to debunking etzsche's, and pace Nietzsche , Emerson's, perfectionism as inherently anti-democratic. While he admits that it is tempting to read both Emerson and Nietzsche as exalting great men, and dismissing the importance of the slavish majority (which is seen as "bugs", "spawn", "mob", "herd"), he insists that there is a better and more consistent way of reading them as speaking not of particular great men, but rather of the possibility of each person for attaining her "unattained but attainable self", for being consecrated to culture. This possibility lies in being disgusted with oneself and one's current state and finding a way for turning away from it, from where we find ourselves at the given moment. Not only is such a possibility in principle open to everyone and hence not necessarily anti-democratic, but, Cavell claims, according to Emerson it is necessary for democracy's survival:
There are undeniably aristocratic or aesthetic perfectionisms. But in Emerson it should, I would like to say, be taken as part of the training for democracy.
[…] I understand the training and character and friendship Emerson requires for democracy as preparation to withstand not its rigors, but its failures, character to keep the democratic hope alive in the face of disappointment with it.
[…] That we will be disappointed in democracy, in its failure by the lights of its own principles of justice, is implied in Rawls' concept of the original position in which those principles are accepted, a perspective from which we know that justice, in actual societies, will be departed from, and that the distance of any actual society from justice is a matter for each of us to assess for ourselves. I will speak of this as our being compromised by the democratic demand for consent, so that the human individual meant to be created and preserved in democracy is apt to be undone by it. 20 And here, we reach the point we have already mentioned-of facing disappointment with the ideals of justice we have consented to. Going back to Boynik's claims, we may now safely say that Cavell does not evoke the "Red Fascist" in order to equate the two totalitarianisms. On the contrary-Cavell replaces the word fascist with what he sees to be a better fit, "patriotism for a still invisible fatherland"-a perfectionism that he subscribes to himself, and which, though mistaken for fascism by an indiscriminate eye (which, as it turns out, might even be an eye of a great philosopher such as Rawls), is actually not only compatible with democracy, but fundamentally important for it.
Boynik also misinterprets the link that Cavell establishes between Marx and Jung, claiming that in Makavejev's film "the world of Marx is healed by the parapsychology of Jung". But, as we will see, this is a very superficial reading of what Cavell actually says.
Let us start from the way Cavell uses the two quotations:
The center of the action of the commune sequence is a communal meal, a feast whose ritualization strikes me as possessing, for all its confusion of tongues, a working solemnity. I think of Marx's characterization of religion as the heart of a heartless world, and I ask myself what the things of acceptance and redemption might look like to those who would actually bring such concepts to earthas if inventing them and giving them a heart. I had not liked Makavejev's complaint that Bergman's "conception of God, especially, the God who does not love people and who makes them unexplainably miserable, seems to me incomprehensible and gratuitous for a serious artist." If this is bad for a serious artist, I felt, it is bad for any human being; but is it a matter over which human Stephen Mulhall deftly summarizes Cavell's position on moral argument by noting that for Cavell such an argument may be rational even though not necessarily leading to consensus. We may agree on standards of pertinence of different considerations, but still disagree about the weight we attach to them, while at the same time recognizing each others' position as rational and worthy of respect:
In Cavell's eyes, contemporary moral argument is a domain which admits of many morally adequate positions being taken on any given topic; and as a result, the particular position a given individual takes up reveals as much about her as the action or judgment under consideration. In this sense, moral argument is both objective […] and subjective […] : it allows people to define and defend the position for which they are prepared to take responsibility, and it allows those others to determine whether that position is one they can respect. 29 Mulhall concludes that this account of rationality in morals is primarily fit for private morality, "its paradigm is an encounter between two people who wish to understand one another better and perhaps work toward an agreement, but whose relationship is clearly an intimate one," and adds that such a model is clearly "ill-suited to the domain of public political morality. 
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Each society, he seems to imply, is failing "by the lights of its own principles of justice". Each idea is being compromised by political practice, thus compromising both the socialist and the liberal who have consented to their respective societies, that isboth Makavejev and Cavell. Still, they both continue to give consent to their societies, "on pain of self-corruption worse than compromise," relying only on their intuitions that "our collective distance form perfect justice is, though in moments painful to the limits of intolerable, still habitable, even necessary as a stage for continued change." Whose intuition is more accurate? Although obviously not neutral (or 33 maybe exactly because he is not neutral), Cavell does not even try to adjudicate between the two positions. In the future, they may come closer together, striking a shared balance between liberty and community, or they may just continue to strive for change each in its own way. What Cavell makes abundantly clear, however, is that Makavejev's position is one that he can respect. 
